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Sigman, Kasari, & Mundy, 1992), and they use less
emotionally based intonation in their voices (Ricks,
1979). This raises the question of the extent to which
children with autism have an understanding of the sub-
jective character of emotions. In other words, do they
understand that emotions are caused by someone’s
wishes and by someone’s ideas about reality and not
by reality itself? Or, in line with the concepts that are
used within so-called theory-of-mind (ToM) research
(e.g., Mitchell, 1996; Wellman, 1990): Do children with
autism understand the causal relationship between de-
sires (wishes, hopes, dreams, ambitions, goals, etc.) and
emotions, and between beliefs (ideas, convictions, ex-
pectations, thoughts, notions, etc.) and emotions?
It is difficult to fully understand the emotions of
other people on the basis of one’s own desires and be-
liefs, as these frequently differ from those of others. It
appears that it is easier for young children to accept
that different people can have different desires, than to
accept that different people can have different beliefs
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INTRODUCTION
Emotions play an important role in our daily con-
tact with others. We, for example, strategically display
emotions to influence other people’s behavior. Irrita-
tion or happiness can be shown in reaction to the be-
havior of others and can even be used to influence
someone’s future actions. In return, we also react to the
emotional responses of others, and we may even an-
ticipate these and adapt our behavior accordingly. A
well-known characteristic of children with autism is the
lack of emotionally based contact with others (Kanner,
1943). Children with autism fail to apply strategic man-
ifestations of emotions. For example, in comparison to
the nonautistic, their facial expressions are less ex-
pressive or inappropriate for the situation, they make
fewer gestures that express an emotional state (Yirmiya,
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about reality. For example, normally developing children
spontaneously refer to others’ desires that deviate from
their own at an earlier age than they refer to divergent
beliefs (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). In the development
of normally developing children, the understanding of
the causal relationship between desires and emotions
precedes the understanding of the causal relationship
between beliefs and emotions (Harris, 1989). Children
with autism show this pattern even more strongly: In
the case of desires, they perform as well as a control
group, but they barely refer to beliefs in their explana-
tions of others’ emotions (Tager-Flusberg, 1992). Also
other findings demonstrate that children with autism
have a better understanding of the causal relationship
between desires and emotions, than between beliefs and
emotions (Baron-Cohen, 1991).
Children’s understanding of beliefs is frequently
investigated by the so-called false-belief paradigm
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Perner, Frith,
Leslie, & Leekam, 1989). In a false-belief task, the pro-
tagonist has an incorrect mental representation of real-
ity, a false belief, whereas participants know this. Chil-
dren with autism find it difficult to understand that,
under such circumstances, they need to predict an-
other’s emotion based on the other’s false belief, and
not on their own knowledge about the situation. It is
suggested that responses on this kind of task are influ-
enced by verbal ability (Boucher, 1996) and that the
poor performance of children with autism (and children
with Asperger syndrome) are partly the result of their
poor verbal abilities. Nevertheless, even when matched
on a verbal index, differences with normally develop-
ing children remain evident (see, e.g., Dahlgren &
Trillingsgaard, 1996). Moreover, children with lan-
guage impairment but not autism have little difficulty
with false belief tasks (Perner et al., 1989, Leslie &
Frith, 1988).
These deviant results of children on the autistic
range are frequently explained by a fundamental deficit
that results in “mindblindness” (Baron-Cohen, 1995;
Carruthers, 1996). Mindblindness implies that children
live in a world in which mental activities, such as dream-
ing, hoping, thinking, and wanting, are not recognized
and play no role. Consequently, they also lack the abil-
ity to attribute mental states to others. Beliefs are men-
tal representations of an objective reality and children
with autism appear not to understand that different peo-
ple can have different perspectives on this objective
reality. However, the prediction or explanation of other
people’s emotions based on desires does not necessar-
ily require the attribution of a mental state, since de-
sires do not conflict with objective reality. Indeed, re-
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search shows that children on the autistic spectrum un-
derstand desires to a certain extent, what they lack is an
understanding of beliefs (Tager-Flusberg, 1992).
In this paper, we investigate the mindblindness hy-
pothesis as an explanation for deificts in theory-of-mind
ToM tasks found in children from the autistic spectrum.
Participants are presented with stories in which mental
state explanations are necessary: Children are asked to
explain atypical emotions. Typical emotions can eas-
ily be explained by situational factors, as these usually
reflect scripted knowledge. For example, the question
why someone is happy when receiving a present evokes
responses such as “because he received a present!”
Such an answer, however, is not sufficient to explain
atypical emotions. When asked why someone is angry
when receiving a present, the answer “because he re-
ceived a present” is inadequate; an angry response is
not typical in this situation. The atypical emotion can-
not be explained in terms of the situation and can only
be explained by referring to the protagonist’s mental
states such as their desires (e.g., “He doesn’t like pre-
sents”) and their beliefs (e.g., “He thinks that it will be
something stupid”; Rieffe, 1998).
At this point a distinction must be made between
typical and atypical emotions. Children with autism
were shown to have a good understanding of typical
emotional scenarios (Capps, Sigman, & Yirmiya, 1995)
and the expectation is that normally developing chil-
dren, as well as children with autism, would frequently
refer to situational determinants in the case of typical
emotions. However, when asked to explain atypical
emotions, it was found that normally developing chil-
dren no longer restricted themselves to situational ex-
planations (Rieffe, 1998). From their point of view,
these cases asked for an explanation in terms of men-
tal states. However, the mindblind hypothesis predicts
that children with autism will not refer to mental states
when explaining atypical emotions. If this perspective
is correct atypical emotions should be largely misun-
derstood by children on the autistic spectrum, evoking
responses such as “don’t know” or “it can’t be.”
In most of the research discussed so far, participants
were diagnosed with “Kanner” autism (Kanner, 1943)
or with the Asperger syndrome (Wing & Gould, 1979).
Our expectations apply foremost to these clinical groups.
Children with Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not
Otherwise Specified (PDDNOS), however, are also fre-
quently included in the autistic spectrum (van Leeuwen
& Stockmann, 1996). Although authors are not very clear
on this issue, it seems as if autism researchers often
include these children. A complicating factor is the
probable heterogeneous character of the group with
PDDNOS. When we took both the social and the cog-
nitive difficulties into consideration, the subgroup Mul-
tiple Complex Developmental Disorder (MCDD) see
Buitelaar & van der Gaag, 1998; Cohen, Paul, & Volk-
mar, 1986) had an obvious affinity. MCDD refers to a
broad range of early-onset disorders, that can mainly be
distinguished from PDDNOS by (a) thought disorders,
manifested as unusual thoughts and difficulties in sepa-
rating fantasy and reality; and (b) disturbances in affect
regulation, manifested as unusual outbursts of anger
and/or panic (Cohen et al., 1986). Van der Gaag (1993)
argued that autism, the Asperger syndrome, and MCDD
could be placed on one continuum. Our research involves
high-functioning children from a broad autistic spectrum.
METHOD
Participants
Twenty-three children in residential care with a
pervasive disorder from the autistic spectrum (M age
9 years 3 months; range 5–8 to 11–8; 19 boys/4 girls)
participated in this study. Based on DSM-IV (Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria, the group
consisted of 2 children with autism, 3 children with the
Asperger syndrome, and 18 children were diagnosed
with PDDNOS. Of these 18 children, 6 were diagnosed
with MCDD, based on the criteria of Cohen et al.
(1986) (Table I). The mean verbal IQ of the partici-
pants (WISC-R) was 90 SD = 17); the verbal IQ of one
child was unknown.
Atypical Emotions in Children with Autism 197
The children from the autistic group were given two
standard false-belief tasks. The first, Wimmer and
Perner’s (1983) standard false-belief task, asked children
to predict the protagonist’s action. The second, Harris,
Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, and Cooke’s (1989) false-
belief task, asked children to predict the protagonist’s
emotion. All children passed both tasks, except for one
child (diagnosed with autism) who passed the action-
prediction task but failed the emotion-prediction task.
The same experiment had already been carried out
with a sample of 42 6-year-olds (M age 6–3; range 5–9
to 7–2) and 43 10-year-olds (M age 10–4; range 9–8 to
10–11). These children were recruited from primary
schools in the suburbs around Amsterdam. Half of these
participants were male and half were female. Although
the composition of these control groups did not match
the clinical group precisely in terms of age and gender,
roughly speaking the oldest control group matched the
clinical group in terms of chronological age, whereas
the youngest group can be considered as a control group
with an equal (or even lower) level of verbal abilities.
Material
The material consisted of six stories (Table II) that
described emotion-eliciting situations. Two stories
were designed to provoke a positive emotion, two sto-
ries were designed to provoke fear, and two stories were
designed to provoke sadness or anger. Although sad-
ness and anger are conceptually different emotions, it
is virtually impossible to design stories in which anger
is an appropriate reaction, but sadness is not, and vice
versa. An event could cause an angry reaction when
one concentrates on the process or on the actor. Yet,
the same event might cause sadness, when one focuses
the nature of the outcome (Stein & Levine, 1989).
After hearing each story, participants were asked
how the protagonist would feel and why (Questions 1
and 2). If participants failed to identify an emotion, they
were asked “Do you think [name protagonist] feels
happy, sad, angry, or afraid?” The order of the sug-
gested emotions was randomized. Once participants had
predicted and explained an emotion, the experimenter
said that the protagonist felt differently and named an
atypical emotion. The atypical emotions (happiness,
anger, or fear) were fixed (see Table II). The experi-
menter asked participants to explain the atypical emo-
tion (Question 3). When participants predicted an un-
expected emotion, the experimenter continued with an
emotion that was opposite to the one named by the
child, because we did not want to discourage partici-
pants. Female protagonists were used for stories that
Table I. Criteria of Multiple Complex Developmental 
Disorder (MCDD)a
At least 2 criteria form A, B, and C are present;
A. Affective State and Anxiety
1. Generalized anxiety, diffuse tension, or irritability
2. Fears and phobias
3. Panic episodes, terror, or “f looding” with anxiety
4. Episodes of behavioral disorganization
5. Emotional lability
B. Social Interaction
1. Social disinterest, detachment, avoidance, or withdrawal
2. Inability to initiate or maintain peer relationships
3. Disturbed attachments to adults
C. Thought Disorder
1. Thought problems, including irrationality, magical thinking
2. Confusion between reality and fantasy
3. Perplexity and easily confused
4. Delusions, paranoid preoccupations
a Based on Cohen, Paul, and Volkmar, 1986.
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involved fear as a typical emotion in order to avoid
“macho” responses (we had noticed in previous stud-
ies that many boys (of all age groups) claimed to never
be afraid during introductory conversations). An ex-
ample of a (sadness/anger) story is:
This is Linda. Linda’s father and mother had said
that they would go to the zoo. But now Linda’s
mother says that they cannot go and that they will
have to stay at home. How does Linda feel now she
hears that she won’t go to the zoo, but has to stay at
home? (1) And why does Linda feel. . . ? (2)
Yes, I would have thought so too. But Linda does
not feel [emotion given by the participant]. Linda
feels happy now she won’t go to the zoo and will
stay at home. How come Linda feels happy? (3)
Procedure
Participants were tested in a quiet room in one ses-
sion of approximately 10 minutes. To make participants
familiar with the emotional concepts that would be used
in the stories, they were asked if they sometimes ex-
perienced happiness, sadness, anger, and fear, and if
they could give an example of such an occasion. The
experimenter helped children who found it difficult to
provide examples. For example: “When it’s your birth-
day, do you feel happy then? Okay, and could you
think of something else now?” No further prompting
was given during the presentation of the six emotion-
eliciting situations. The order of the six presented sto-
ries was randomized. Sessions were tape-recorded.
Scoring
To ascertain the extent to which children attrib-
uted mental states to the protagonist in their emotion
explanations, responses were assigned to one of the fol-
lowing categories:
Fact Beliefs. This category was applied when par-
ticipants referred to the protagonist’s beliefs about the
situation. For example Linda is happy now she won’t
go to the zoo “. . . because she thinks that she will do
something else.”
Desires & Preferences. This category was applied
to answers referring to the protagonist’s desires or pref-
erences. For example, Linda is happy “. . . because she
doesn’t like the zoo, she doesn’t like the animals” or “be-
cause she wants to stay home and play with her cat.”
Value beliefs, that is, beliefs that do not refer to reality
but to someone’s preferences, were also included in this
category.
Situational. Answers that only elaborated on the
situation or referred to another situation without refer-
ence to a protagonist’s mental state fell into this cate-
gory. For example: “because she has already been there.”
Don’t Know. Responses of children that failed to
explain the protagonist’s emotion fell into this category.
Missing. This category was applied if (a) the par-
ticipant had not predicted the typical emotion, or (b) the
answer was missing on the tape. The responses of 4 par-
ticipants (1 child with autism and 3 6-year-olds) were
excluded from further analyses, because they had two
missing values on one emotion cluster (two happiness,
anger/sadness, or fear stories). When participants had
one missing value per emotion cluster, the remaining
score was included in the analysis.
Note that children from the control group and from
the clinical group rarely responded with inappropriate or
unreasonable explanations (the above examples in the
scoring section are responses given by the clinical
group). Nevertheless, there were some differences that
can be considered as indicative for the different groups:
Children from the control groups frequently referred to
social interactions (Linda was happy not to go to the zoo,
because she wanted to play with a friend), whereas chil-
dren from the autistic spectrum thought that Linda would
do something solitary. Only one child reacted in an un-
usual way, he argued that Linda was happy not to go to
the zoo because she was an animal killer. It might not
be surprising that this child was diagnosed with MCDD.
Note also that the categories for beliefs and desires
were not exclusive, as the response to the story in which
a girl hears a strange noise while lying in bed “Because
she thinks it is a burglar and she wants to sleep” refers
to a desire and a fact belief. Responses were then as-
signed to both categories. This was the case for 11, 26,
and 43 responses by the group with autism, 6- and
10 year-olds, respectively. Two raters coded all re-
sponses. The interrater agreement was 97% and dis-
agreements were resolved by discussion.
Table II. Six Stories with Typical and Atypical Emotions
Story content Typical Atypical
1. Boy receives present  Happy Angry
from his mother
2. Girl goes outside to play Happy Afraid
hide and seek with others
3. Girl cannot go to the zoo, Angry/sad Happy
but has to stay at home
4. Boy has a dog that is a bit ill Sad Afraid
5. Girl in dark house sees a Afraid Happy
person she cannot identify
6. Girl lies in bed and hears Afraid Angry
a strange noise
RESULTS
Typical Emotion Predictions
The expected or typical emotion was predicted for
92% of the responses (Question 1). The typical emotion
was more often correctly predicted by 10-year-olds (96%
correct) than by 6-year-olds (90% correct) and children
from the autistic spectrum (90% correct). One story, in
which a girl goes outside to play with other children,
evoked some unexpected emotion predictions. Twelve
6-year-olds, six 10-year-olds, and six children from
the clinical group did not predict that the girl would be
happy, but angry, sad, or scared. The other stories nearly
always evoked an expected emotion prediction. In gen-
eral, the typical emotions were reasonably well predicted.
Explanations for Typical and Atypical Emotions
The expectation was that children from the autis-
tic spectrum would attribute fewer mental states when
explaining the protagonist’s (both typical and atypical)
emotion than normally developing children. Table III
shows the total number of mental state attributions, di-
vided by the number of stories (6). It can be seen that
the clinical group referred less to mental states when
asked to explain typical emotions than the control
groups. In contrast to the mindblind hypothesis, how-
ever, they gave more mental state attributions than the
control groups when asked to explain atypical emo-
tions. It can be seen that all groups attribute more men-
tal states when asked to explain atypical emotions than
typical emotions, but this difference is largest for the
clinical group. A 3 (Group) · 2 (Mental State: desire
vs. belief) · 3 (Emotion: happiness, anger/sadness, fear)
· 2 (Type: typical vs. atypical) analysis of variance
with repeated measures on the last three factors con-
firmed a main effect for Type, F(1, 101) = 20.75, p =
.000, and an interaction for Group · Type, F(2, 101) =
3.87, p = .024. Post-hoc analysis of variance confirmed
a difference for the mental state attributions between
the three groups in the typical condition, F(2, 101) =
5.00, p = .008, but not in the atypical condition. Note
also that, contrary to our expectations, responses of
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children from the autistic spectrum were never scored
in the category “don’t know.”
A further division suggests an equal pattern of re-
sponses among the three subgroups of children from
the autistic spectrum (Table IV). All groups performed
relatively poorly for typical emotions and relatively
well for atypical emotions. This pattern appears most
strongly for children with PDDNOS and seems unre-
lated to children’s verbal IQ: The mean VIQ of the
PDDNOS group (90) is lower than that of the autis-
tic/Asperger group (104), but higher than that of the
MCDD children (81). Note, however, that the small
samples preclude testing these groups separately and
that these results are only indicative.
Besides the effects for Type and Group · Type, it
appears that all interactions between Mental State, Type,
and Emotion are statistically significant: Mental State ·
Type, F(1, 101) = 27.06, p = .000; Mental State · Emo-
tion, F(2, 202) = 106.06, p = .000; Type · Emotion,
F(2, 202) = 13.69, p = .000; (and (relatively weak) inter-
action of Mental State · Type · Emotion, F(2, 202) =
3.14, p < .05. Table V shows the proportion of desire
and belief attributions as a function of Type and Emo-
tion. Apparently, children’s response to fear differs
from their response to happiness and anger/sadness.
Fear evokes many belief attributions and only a few de-
sire attributions. The other emotions show an opposite
pattern. Moreover, belief attributions occur less for
atypical than typical fear, whereas belief and desire at-
tributions increase in the case of happiness and anger/
sadness. It is argued in the Discussion that these dif-
ferences are probably caused by the anticipating char-
acter of fear. More important, however, is the fact that
mental state and emotion show no interaction with
Group, implying that children from the autistic spec-
trum attribute as many beliefs and desires as normally
developing children. Also when we looked at the three
subgroups of children from the autistic spectrum, there
were no apparent differences between their mental state
explanations and those of the control groups for fear,
anger/sadness, or happiness.
DISCUSSION
Earlier findings showed that children from the
autistic spectrum sometimes explain other people’s
emotions in terms of desires but rarely in terms of be-
liefs (Tager-Flusberg, 1992). Our research confirms
this finding with regard to typical emotions, but not
with regard to atypical emotions. In the case of typi-
cal emotions (happiness on receiving a present), our
Table III. Proportion of Mental State Attributions of Six Stories
as a Function of Group · Typical or Atypical Emotion Explanation
Group n Typical Atypical
Children with autism 22 .24 .56
6-year-olds 39 .39 .47
10-year-olds 43 .48 .55
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asked to explain atypical happiness, anger, or sadness.
Fear, by contrast, evoked many belief attributions.
Fear is experienced as a threat to one’s security or
safety (Izard, 1991). It is an emotion that anticipates
a possible outcome: One’s beliefs about future events
can evoke fear. The finding that participants referred
more to beliefs in the case of typical than atypical fear
was unforeseen. This is probably due to an unexpected
difference in story types. The typical fear stories ap-
pealed to fear for the unknown (an unknown person
or noise in a dark environment), whereas the atypical
fear stories were more focused on a specific situation
(fear because one’s dog is ill and fear because one
goes outside to play with others). Especially when
children had to explain typical fear, the protagonist’s
lack of knowledge about the situation was perceived
as important and this evoked relatively many belief
attributions: “She doesn’t know what it is.”
Comparisons among the response patterns of the
three subgroups (Autism/Asperger, MCDD, and
PDDNOS) support the idea that the cognitive function-
ing of the MCDD and PDDNOS groups is closely re-
lated to that of the Autism/Asperger group (Cohen et al.,
1986). As yet, we have no available explanation for our
finding that the PDDNOS children’s responses were
even more pronounced than those of the other groups.
Overall, we may conclude that our data demonstrate
that children from the autistic spectrum do have a mind-
reading capacity, but they simply do not apply this
spontaneously to the same extent as normally develop-
ing children. These findings contradict the mindblind
autistic participants with a mean age of 9 years attrib-
uted even fewer mental states (desires and beliefs) than
a much younger control group of 6-year-olds. However,
in the case of atypical emotions (e.g., anger on receiv-
ing a present), the clinical group performed as well as
a 10-year-old control group of normally developing
children. Thus, children from the autistic spectrum un-
derstood atypical emotions in terms of the protagonist’s
mental states: Both beliefs and desires were attributed
to the same extent as in normally developing children.
Like their peers, children from the autistic spectrum ex-
plained, for example, that Michelle was happy to ob-
serve that there was someone in the dark living room
(atypical emotion in a prototypical fear situation), “be-
cause she knows that it is her father or mother.” Note
that the content of these responses was as appropriate
as those of the control group. In conclusion, explana-
tions of prototypical emotions suggest a deficit in the
mind-reading capacity of children from the autistic
spectrum. Yet, they perform as well as a normally de-
veloping peer group in their explanations of unex-
pected, atypical emotions.
Not surprisingly, it was shown that the ratio of
desire and belief attributions differed per emotion do-
main, for all groups. Happiness, anger, and sadness
are predominantly related to the outcome of a situa-
tion. When one attains or maintains a desired state,
happiness is aroused, whereas anger or sadness is
aroused when one feels frustrated in the achievement
of a desired state (Frijda, 1986; Stein & Levine, 1989).
Desire attributions increased when participants were
Table IV. Proportion of Mental State Attributions for Typical and Atypical Emotion 
Explanations per Subgroup from the Autistic Domain
Subgroup n M age VIQ PIQ Typical Atypical
Autism/Asperger 4 8-0 104 98 .34 .57
MCDD 6 9-4 81 83 .33 .41
PDDNOS 12 9-6 90 89 .15 .64
(MCDD excluded)
Table V. Proportion of Desire and Belief Attributions for Typical and Atypical 
Emotion Explanations (n = 104)
Belief attributions Desire attributions
Emotion Happiness Anger/sadness Fear Happiness Anger/sadness Fear
Typical .11 .07 .44 .20 .21 .06
Atypical .18 .12 .28 .28 .47 .12
hypothesis, which holds that children with autism do
not acknowledge mental states as an explanation for an-
other’s emotion or (emotional) behaviour.
The fact that children from the autistic spectrum
produced mental states in our research, whereas this
basic capacity is hardly manifest in other findings
(Tager-Flusberg, 1992), might be explained by a com-
bination of factors. First, unlike typical emotions, atyp-
ical emotions cannot easily be rationalized by purely
situational explanations. The answer that someone is
happy because she is not going to the zoo anymore
(atypical emotion) is not sufficient, because it puzzles
the listener and evokes more questions. A more suit-
able solution for these atypical emotions is to address
the subjective element of emotions (Rieffe, 1998):
Probably, the protagonist wanted to do something else,
or she believed that her mother had made a joke. The
fact that atypical emotions strongly appeal to normally
developing children’s appreciation of mental states as
the cause of emotions seems to have had an effect on
children from the autistic spectrum as well. Moreover,
an explanation in terms of the situation was not en-
couraged, since children’s mainly situational explana-
tions for the protagonist’s typical emotions were al-
ways rejected “I would have though so too, but. . . .”
Children might have interpreted such a response as a
correction, as if they were expected to search for other
options in their explanation of atypical emotions.
Second, it is also argued that children with autism
have a weak drive for central coherence (Frith, 1989;
Happé, 1994) or a generative impairment (Jarrold,
1997). The central coherence hypothesis states that
these children cannot derive the necessary information
from a situation to assemble a context-dependent mean-
ing. Consequently, they might react to details in a sit-
uation that others perceive as unimportant (see Weeks
& Hobson, 1987). For example, children with autism
refer to many details when they are asked to describe
a drawing depicting a car accident (“here is a stop sign,”
“someone is lying on the road,” “here is a car”), but
they do not refer to the accident. The generative hy-
pothesis states that the required internal representations
are not readily accessible for children with autism. Im-
portantly, both the central coherence hypothesis and the
generative hypothesis predict that the performance of
children with autism improves if they are told where to
direct their focus. This is exactly what the first part of
each story might have done. The first two questions in
our stories: “How does she feel?” and “Why does she
feel. . . ?” focused children on the protagonist’s emo-
tion and showed children that the experimenter was in-
terested in an explanation of this emotion. Thus, by the
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time they were asked to explain the atypical emotion,
they had already concentrated on the protagonist’s ex-
perience of the situation. In other words, the first emo-
tion explanation might have caused a priming effect.
Other findings strengthen the idea that the performance
of children with autism improves when they are ap-
propriately prompted. For example, their pretend play
(symbolic and functional) is found to be impaired in
spontaneous situations, but not in structured situations
in which the idea for pretence is specified (Jarrold,
1997; Jarrold, Boucher, & Smith, 1993).
The question is why, if they have the capacity to
mind read, children from the autistic spectrum hardly
seem to apply this capacity. Do they not understand
spontaneously that mind reading can help them in their
contact with others in everyday life? Or do they not
appreciate the advantage of mind reading? When we
observe high-functioning children from the autistic
spectrum in their daily life, many (but not all) appeared
to lack curiousity for others, unless they have a direct
need to obtain something from another person. Their
play is solitary (or someone else is allowed to partic-
ipate on their terms) and they do not even look, for ex-
ample, when another child falls over and hurts him or
herself. Yet, as soon as something unexpected or some-
thing exciting happens, many high-functioning chil-
dren with autism know where to find a caretaker to
hold their hand.
It has been argued that stress and anxiety play a
crucial role in many behavioral problems of children
with autism (Groden, Cautela, Prince, & Berryman,
1994). There are several factors that might be the
cause for a higher level of stress: their poor ability for
central coherence (Frith, 1989; Happé, 1994), per-
ceptual hypersensitivity (Bettison, 1996; O’Neill &
Jones, 1997), or an information-processing disorder
(Minshew, Goldstein, & Siegel, 1997) might all cause
children from the autistic spectrum to have difficul-
ties with handling too many stimuli simultaneously.
For example, when one cannot interpret a situation be-
cause one does not understand its context-dependent
meaning, one is bombarded with seemingly meaning-
less stimuli and is unable to arrange these hierarchi-
cally as other people do. Too much information, or
too many stimuli simultaneously which cannot be
properly processed, might cause anxiety or stress. It
could be argued that children from the autistic spec-
trum try to avoid situations that cause an arousal of
their level of stress, and consequently, they try to
avoid social interactions with others. In that case, their
mind-reading capacity under everyday circumstances
would be basically intact but unused, and hence
perhaps underdeveloped but not necessarily defective
as suggested by the mindblind hypothesis.
The idea that the level of stress plays a crucial role
in their daily functioning would also explain, for ex-
ample, why many children with autism—also high-
functioning children—can be observed to intensify their
repetitive behavior or self-stimulation and close off
their interactions with others even more in times of
pressure. It seems as if the extent to which they toler-
ate external information is related to the level of tran-
quility of the situation. The hypothesis that children
from the autistic spectrum only have room to mind read
when their level of stress is reduced is recognizable for
many of us: Don’t most people totally lose their inter-
est in others the moment they are severely bothered by
their own problems?
It is important to note that this difference in ap-
proach also leads to different ideas on how children
from the autistic spectrum can be stimulated, for ex-
ample, in their performance of ToM tasks. Based on
the mindblind hypothesis, one would expect them to
improve when they are taught different techniques to
execute ToM tasks. Research in this area showed, how-
ever, that their improved performances on one kind of
task were not applied to tasks in other domains when
children received no training (Hadwin, Baron-Cohen,
Howlin, & Hill, 1997). The unused mind-reading ca-
pacity hypothesis, on the other hand, predicts that chil-
dren from the autistic spectrum have theory of mind
capacities that remain latent, but could be revived when
conditions are optimal. Enhancing the saliency for a
ToM explanation proved to be effective in the present
experiment. Other possibilities, for instance the intro-
duction of personal gain—shown to be effective in nor-
mally developing 3- to 5-year-olds (Meerum Terwogt,
Rieffe, Tuijn, Harris & Mant, 1999)—might have a
similar effect. This suggestion is currently being in-
vestigated.
REFERENCES
American Psychiatric Association. (1994). Diagnostic and Statistical
manual of mental disorders (4th ed.). Washington, DC: Author.
Baron-Cohen, S. (1991). Do people with autism understand what
causes emotion? Child Development, 62, 385–395.
Baron-Cohen, S. (1995). Mindblindness: An essay on autism and
theory of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autis-
tic child have a ‘theory of mind’? Cognition, 21, 37–46.
Bartsch, K., & Wellman, H. M. (1995). Children talk about the mind.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Bettison, S. (1996). The long-term effects of auditory training on
children with autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Dis-
orders, 26, 361–374.
202 Rieffe, Meerum Terwogt, and Stockmann
Boucher, J. (1996). What could possibly explain autism? In P.
Carruthers & P. K. Smith (Eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind
(pp. 223–241). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Buitelaar, J. K., & Gaag, J. van der (1998). Diagnostic rules for chil-
dren with PDD-NOS and Multiple Complex Developmental Dis-
order. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 39, 911–919.
Capps, L., Sigman, M., & Yirmiya, N. (1995). Self-competence and
emotional understanding in high-functioning children with
autism. Development and Psychopathology, 7, 137–150.
Carruthers, P. (1996). Autism as mind-blindness: an elaboration and
partial defence. In P. Carruthers & P. K. Smith (Eds.), Theories
of Theories of Mind (pp. 257–273). New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Cohen, D. J., Paul, R., & Volkmar, F. R. (1986). Issues in the Clas-
sification of Pervasive and Other Developmental Disorders: To-
ward DSM-IV. Journal of the American Academy of Child and
Adolescent Psychiatry, 25, 213–220.
Dahlgren, S. O., & Trillingsgaard, A. (1996). Theory of Mind in non-
retarded children with autism and asperger’s syndrome. A research
note. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 37, 759–763.
Frijda, N. (1986). The Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Frith, U. (1989). Explaining the enigma. Oxford: Blackwell.
Gaag, J. van der (1993). Multiplex development disorder. Unpub-
lished dissertation, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands.
Groden, J., Cautela, J., Prince S., & Berryman J. (1994). The impact
of stress and anxiety on individuals with autism and develop-
mental disabilities. In E. Schopler & G. B. Mesibov (Eds.),
Behavioral issues in autism. Current issues in autism
(pp. 177–194). New York: Plenum Press.
Hadwin, J., Baron-Cohen, S., Howlin, P., & Hill, K. (1997). Does
teaching theory of mind have an effect on the ability to develop
conversation in children with autism? Journal of Autism and De-
velopmental Disorders, 27, 519–537.
Happé, F. (1994). Autism, an introduction to psychological theory.
London: UCL Press.
Harris, P. L. (1989). Children and Emotion. Oxford: Blackwell.
Harris, P. L., Johnson, C. N., Hutton, D, Andrews, G., & Cooke, T.
(1989). Young children’s theory of mind and emotion. Cogni-
tion and Emotion, 3, 379–400.
Izard, C. (1991). The psychology of emotions. New York: Plenum
Press.
Jarrold, C. (1997). Pretend play in autism: Executive explanations. In:
J. Russell (Ed.), Autism as an executive disorder (pp. 101–140).
New York: Oxford University Press.
Jarrold, C., Boucher, J., & Smith, P. (1993). Symbolic play in autism:
A review. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 23,
281–307.
Kanner, L. (1943). Autistic disturbances of affective contact. Ner-
vous Child, 2, 217–250.
Leeuwen, H. M. P. van, & Stockmann, A. P. A. M. (1996). Klinis-
che diagnostiek van aan autisme verwante stoornissen (Clinical
diagnoses of pervasive disorders). Kind en Adolecent, 17, 82–99.
Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1988). Autistic children’s understanding
of seeing, knowing and believing. British Journal of Develop-
mental Psychology, 6, 315–324.
Meerum Terwogt M., Rieffe C., Tuijn A., Harris P. L., & Mart I.
(1999). Children’s spontaneous correction of false beliefs in a
conversation partner. International Journal of Behavioral De-
velopment, 23, 113–124.
Minshew, N. J., Goldstein, G., & Siegel, D. J. (1997). Neuropsy-
chologic functioning in autism: Profile of a complex informa-
tion processing. Journal of the International Neuropsychologi-
cal Society, 3, 303–316.
Mitchell, P. (1996). Acquiring a conception of mind: A review of psy-
chological research and theory. Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
O’Neill, M., & Jones, R. S. P. (1997). Sensory-perceptual abnor-
malities in autism: a case for more research? Journal of Autism
and Developmental Disorders, 27, 283–292.
Atypical Emotions in Children with Autism 203
Perner, J., Frith, U., Leslie, A. M., & Leekam, S. (1989). Exploration
of the autistic child’s theory of mind: Knowledge, belief, and
communication. Child Development, 60, 689–700.
Ricks, D. M. (1979). Making sense of experience to make sensible
sounds. In M. Bullowa (Ed.), Before speech: The beginning of
interpersonal communication, (pp. 245–268). New York, Cam-
bridge University Press.
Rieffe, C. (1998). The child’s theory of mind: Understanding desires,
beliefs, and emotions. Unpublished dissertation, Free Univer-
sity, Amsterdam.
Stein, N. L., & Levine. L. J. (1989. The causal organization of emo-
tional knowledge: a developmental study. Cognitive Emotions,
3, 343–378.
Tager-Flusberg, H. (1992). Autistic children’s talk about the psy-
chological states: deficits in the early acquisition of a Theory of
Mind. Child Development, 63, 161–172.
Yirmiya, N., Sigman, M., Kasari, C., & Mundy, P. (1992). Empathy
and cognition in high-functioning children with autism. Child
Development, 63, 150–160.
Weeks, S. J., & Hobson, R. P. (1987). The salience of facial expres-
sion for autistic children. Journal of Child Psychology and Psy-
chiatry, 28, 137–52.
Wellman, H. M. (1990). The child’s theory of mind. Cambridge, MA:
M.I.T. Press.
Wimmer H., & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Repre-
sentation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in 
young children’s understanding of deception. Cognition, 13,
103–128.
Wing, L., & Gould, J. (1979). Severe impairments of social interac-
tion and associated abnormalities in children: epidemiology and
classification. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders,
9, 11–29.

